Abstract-Dempster-Shafer evidence theory is a primary methodology for multisource information fusion because it is good at dealing with uncertain information. This theory provides a Dempster's rule of combination to synthesize multiple evidences from various information sources. However, in some cases, counter-intuitive results may be obtained based on that combination rule. Numerous new or improved methods have been proposed to suppress these counter-intuitive results based on perspectives, such as minimizing the information loss or deviation. Inspired by evolutionary game theory, this paper considers a biological and evolutionary perspective to study the combination of evidences. An evolutionary combination rule (ECR) is proposed to help find the most biologically supported proposition in a multievidence system. Within the proposed ECR, we develop a Jaccard matrix game to formalize the interaction between propositions in evidences, and utilize the replicator dynamics to mimick the evolution of propositions. Experimental results show that the proposed ECR can effectively suppress the counter-intuitive behaviors appeared in typical paradoxes of evidence theory, compared with many existing methods. Properties of the ECR, such as solution's stability and convergence, have been mathematically proved as well. Index Terms-Belief function, Dempster-Shafer evidence theory, evolutionary game theory (EGT), evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), multisource information fusion, replicator equation (RE).
I. INTRODUCTION
M ULTISOURCE information fusion aims to integrate multiple data and knowledge from various information sources into a consistent, comprehensive, and useful estimation for objects. Many issues in a variety of disciplines can be translated into canonical multisource information fusion problems. Because of that, many fields extensively use multisource information fusion [1] , [2] . Yet, a crucial issue remains in multisource information fusion regarding how to represent and dispose the imprecise, fuzzy, ambiguous, inconsistent, and even incomplete information [3] - [5] . As a tool of reasoning in an uncertain environment, Dempter-Shafer evidence theory [6] , [7] established a rounded system for uncertainty management [8] - [12] . In this theory, the data from each information source are represented as a mass function, also referred to as evidence, and Dempster's rule of combination is provided to combine multiple evidences for the fusion of multisource information. However, the combination rule is controversial. Even though it has many desirable characteristics, such as commutativity, associativity, and fast and clear convergence toward a solution, in some cases, especially when the evidences to be combined are highly conflicting, Dempster's rule of combination may produce counter-intuitive results illustrated by Zadeh's paradox [13] , evidence shifting [14] , [15] , dictatorial power (DP) of Dempster's rule [16] , [17] , etc.
Since Dempster's rule can produce counter-intuitive results, much debate and effort has gone into developing alternatives or new methods for evidence combination, such as conjunctive rule [18] , disjunctive rule [19] , cautious conjunctive rule, and bold disjunctive rule [15] , [20] - [27] . In the controversy of Dempster's rule [28] - [33] , some believe the rule is inadequate and advocate modification of the original rule or propose new rules entirely, whereas others defend Dempster's rule and advocate the modification or preprocess of original evidences [16] . Corporately, both sides are expected to draw a synthetic evidence that can best represent the system consisting of all original evidences, which is a typical information fusion process. During the process, a hidden criterion is to minimize the information loss or information deviation between the obtained synthetic evidence and the original evidences. This criterion is typically based on physical or engineering perspective, such as principle of conservation of information.
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Inspired by evolutionary game theory (EGT), this paper uses a biological and evolutionary perspective to study information fusion. In order to obtain the most supported propositions, the process of evidence combination is compared to the evolution of species to find individuals with the highest fitness and survival rate in a population. During this process, EGT [34] , [35] provides a theoretical framework. Specifically, the supported propositions in evidences are treated as strategies adopted by individuals in a given population. First, by interacting with others, individuals receive payoff which determines their fitness within the population. Then, individuals with high fitness have a higher probability to reproduce, thereby increasing their rate within the population. Finally, through the evolution of population, individuals with the highest fitness survive, and the strategy adopted by them succeeds in becoming the most supported or acceptable proposition. The proposed method is called as evolutionary combination rule (ECR). Although, the method is referred to as a rule, the ECR is not a traditional evidence combination rule, which would be expected to obtain a synthetic evidence. Rather, the ECR aims to find the most supported proposition in a multievidence system. And because ECR can directly find the proposition(s) with the highest fitness, the proposed ECR provides fast decisionmaking support for evidence-based multisource information fusion without relying on a transformation function between evidence and probability distribution.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief introduction to Dempster-Shafer evidence theory and EGT. Section III presents the proposed ECR, which primarily contains five parts, including evidence weighted averaging, construction of Jaccard matrix game (JMG), evolutionary dynamics, evolution of averaging evidence, and 2-D measure output. After that, illustrative examples are given to show the effectiveness of the proposed method in Section IV. Finally, Section V concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Dempster-Shafer Evidence Theory
Dempster-Shafer evidence theory [6] , [7] also called Dempster-Shafer theory (DST) or evidence theory, is used to handle uncertain information. This theory requires weaker conditions than that of Bayesian theory of probability, so DST is often regarded as an extension of Bayesian theory (see discussion in [17] ). Recently, different fields have expressed concerns over the applications of DST, such as parameter estimation [36] , [37] , classification and clustering [38] - [40] , and decision-making [41] - [51] . And, as an extension of this theory, Dezert-Smarandache Theory of plausible and paradoxical reasoning [52] -[54] has also been given much attention [27] , [55] . A few basic concepts on DST are introduced below.
Let be a set of mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive events, indicated by = {E 1 , E 2 , . . . , E i , . . . , E N }, where set is called a frame of discernment (FOD). The power set of is indicated by 2 , namely 2 = {∅, 
In DST, a mass function is also called a basic probability assignment (BPA), a belief function, or a piece of evidence. The assigned probability m(A) measures the belief exactly assigned to A and represents how strongly the evidence supports A. If m(A) > 0, A is called a focal element. In DST, two independent evidences m 1 and m 2 are combined with Dempster's rule of combination, denoted by m = m 1 ⊕ m 2 , and defined as follows:
with
B. Evolutionary Game Theory
Developed by Smith and Price [34] and Smith [35] , EGT studies the interaction among different players or populations. In recent years, EGT has become a paradigmatic framework to understand the emergence and evolution of cooperation among unrelated individuals [56] - [63] , and inspired wide applications in myriad disciplines [64] - [71] . Nowak and May [72] first investigated a spatial prisoner's dilemma to demonstrate that spatial structure can promote cooperation. Axelrod's computer tournament [73] provided a platform to observe how cooperation evolves in a competitive environment. Santos and Pacheco [74] found that the cooperation can be greatly promoted in a scale-free network. Recent advances about the EGT can be found in [75] and [76] . The main idea of the EGT is to track the change of each strategy's frequency in the population during the evolutionary process. Two-key concepts of EGT are evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) [34] and replicator equation (RE) [77] , [78] .
1) Evolutionary Stable Strategy:
In a given environment, ESS is a strategy adopted by a population that cannot be invaded by any other alternative strategy which is initially rare. The conditions required by an ESS are formulated as follows [34] , [35] :
or
E(S, S) = E(T, S) and E(S, T) > E(T, T)
for all T = S, where strategy S is an ESS, T is an alternative strategy, and E(T, S) denotes the payoff of strategy T playing against strategy S. Biologically, an ESS cannot be successfully invaded by any mutant strategies. In game theory, there are two kinds of strategies: 1) pure strategies and 2) mixed strategies. A pure strategy defines an absolutely certain action or move that a player will play in every possible attainable situation within a game. In contrast, a mixed strategy is an assignment of a probability to pure strategies, allowing a player to randomly select a pure strategy. In other words, in a mixed strategy, there are two or more pure strategies that can be selected by chance. If the ESS S is a pure strategy, then S is called a pure ESS. Once S is a mixed strategy, S is called mixed ESS.
2) Replicator Equation:
In EGT, the RE [77] , [78] plays a key role in determining the evolutionary process of a population, by providing a frequency-dependent evolutionary dynamics.
Assume there exists n strategies in a well-mixed population. A game payoff matrix A = [a ij ] determines the payoff of a player with strategy i if he meets another player who carries out strategy j. The relative frequency of strategy i, denoted as x i , changes with time by the following differential equation:
where f i is the fitness of strategy i which is defined by f i = n j=1 x j a ij , and φ is the average fitness of all strategies which is defined by φ = n i=1 x i f i . Equation (6) is the so-called RE, which implies that the change of x i depends on the fitness of strategy i and x i itself. By solving (dx i /dt) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n, the fixed points of this evolutionary system, denoted as (x * 1 , . . . , x * n ), can be found. Regarding the stability of each fixed point (x * 1 , . . . , x * n ), a theorem is usually used to verify whether or not the fixed point is stable, which is given below.
Theorem 1 [78] : Given a set of REs
is asymptotically stable if all eigenvalues associated with p * are negative numbers or have negative real parts.
For more details on the theorem, please refer to [78] . As shown in Theorem 1, the stability of a solution is based on the resulting sign of the real part of the eigenvalues. However, when the eigenvalues are pure imaginary numbers, this theorem is not capable for the stability analysis. In that case, the vector field method [79] can be used for the stability analysis of REs.
III. EVOLUTIONARY COMBINATION RULE
Traditional approaches of evidence combination aim to obtain a new evidence that best synthesizes all information. Then, decisions can be made based on the obtained synthetic evidence. In this paper, instead of seeking the best synthetic evidence, our purpose is to find the best supported proposition (i.e., a nonempty subset of the FOD)-analogous to finding the most probable element given a probability distribution. In order to achieve that purpose, an intuitive approach is to directly compare the mass of belief of each proposition among all evidences. However, the drawback of the intuitive approach is obvious because it ignores the interactions between propositions. Natural selection, which provides an excellent mechanism to find individuals with higher fitness, has inspired us to consider this problem from a biological and evolutionary standpoint. It is interesting to transplant the mechanism of natural selection to information fusion.
In this paper, we propose a new method, called ECR, for evidence combination based on EGT. In the ECR, propositions in the FOD are naturally seen as strategies that can be adopted by a population in a given environment. Through the evolutionary process of population, the propositions with the higher fitness are found out to facilitate the subsequent analysis and decision. Fig. 1 gives the framework of proposed ECR. There are five parts, including evidence-weighted averaging, construction of the JMG, evolutionary dynamics, evolution of averaging evidence, and 2-D measure output, all of which will be detailed further in this section. Most notably, in the proposed ECR, there are two basic problems: 1) what are the interactive relationships between propositions (strategies) and 2) how do propositions evolve in a population. As shown in the following content, the two questions are answered in detail in parts B and C, respectively.
A. Evidence Weighted Averaging
Given multiple evidences from different information sources, in accord with the traditional assumption, these evidences are mutually independent. For these independent evidences, by considering the difference of importance among information sources, the weighted averaging approach is used to integrate multiple evidences.
Given an FOD , assume there are n evidences or BPAs indicated by m 1 , . . . , m n , with each evidence having a weighting factor indicated by w i , n i=1 w i = 1. The averaging evidence is denoted as m, which is obtained by
B. Jaccard Matrix Game
In the ECR, propositions (i.e., nonempty subsets of the FOD) are treated as strategies. A key problem is to define the interaction rule between these propositions. Given an FOD , suppose proposition A meets proposition B, how many payoffs will be obtained for A, and then for B as well. In biology, there is a so-called greenbeard effect that shows cooperative behaviors are more likely to appear between individuals with similar phenotypes [80] . Inspired by that, an individual with a proposition, say A, should obtain more payoffs if he/she interacts with another individual with a proposition similar to A. Specially, in an interaction, each individual obtains 1 if the two propositions are identical and 0 if the propositions are totally different. Here, since propositions are represented in the forms of sets, the measure of similarity degree between sets is considered to solve this problem. Mathematically, the Jaccard similarity coefficient measures the similarity degree between two sets [81] . Therefore, a game model, named as JMG, is proposed to formalize the interaction relationship between propositions.
Definition 1: Given an FOD , a JMG on is defined as follows:
where the set of strategies is composed by propositions of
represents the payoff of proposition A playing against proposition B, and it is defined by the Jaccard similarity coefficient between sets A and B, i.e.,
Example 1: Given an FOD with two elements = {a, b}, a JMG on , denoted as ( , J ), can be constructed. In this game, the set of all potential strategies is {a, b, ab} (for the sake of presentation, set {x, y} is abbreviated as xy), and the payoff matrix is easily calculated
Each proposition A ⊆ in FOD is equivalent to a pure strategy in the JMG, all propositions consist of the set of pure strategies adopted by a population. As shown in the above example, a JMG can be constructed if an FOD is given. Two important corollaries about the JMG are shown below.
, where S 1 and S 2 are players' sets of strategies, and their payoff functions are E i : s 2 ) for all s 1 ∈ S 1 and s 2 ∈ S 2 . Due to the symmetry of strategy spaces and payoff matrices, the partnership game can also be written as (S, E) where E is the shared payoff matrix by two players and E = E T . According to Definition 1, in a JMG ( , J ), the strategy sets of all players are the same, i.e., {A|A ⊆ , A = ∅}. And A) . So the JMG is a partnership game.
Corollary 2: Let ESS be the set of all ESSs in the JMG ( , J ), then
Proof: First, let us prove that each pure strategy in the JMG is definitely an ESS.
Assume all propositions in are indexed by 1, 2, . . . ,
is a pure strategy associated with proposition k if p k = 1 and ∀l = k, p l = 0. The payoff of pure strategy A playing against itself is
For any other strategy B = (q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q 2 | | −1 ), where q i ≥ 0 and
q i = 1, and B = A (i.e., ∃j such that q j = p j ), the payoff of B playing against A is
So, E(A, A) > E(B, A). According to (4), A is an ESS.
Second, let us prove that all ESSs are pure strategies, which just needs to prove that any mixed strategy in the JMG is not an ESS. Assume there are two strategies,
, where P is a mixed strategy and Q can be either a mixed or pure strategy, and P = Q. Then
Since P can only be a mixed strategy, i.e.,
Similarly, it is found that E(Q, P) =
Because Q can be a pure or mixed strategy, let q k = 1, where T k = max [T i ], and we can obtain that E(Q, P) = max [T i ].
So, a Q always exists such that E(Q, P) ≥ E(P, P). The first alternative condition of mixed strategy P as an ESS, shown in (4), does not hold.
Let us check the second alternative condition shown in (5) .
where equality holds if ∀i, j, U i = U j , and there always exists a Q such that E(Q, Q) = max [U i ]. Thus, it is found that ∃Q where Q = P, such that E(Q, Q) ≥ E(P, Q), for each P. Hence, for mixed strategy P, the condition shown in (5) also does not hold. That means mixed strategies cannot be ESSs in the JMG, which finishes the proof.
Corollary 2 shows a one-to-one correspondence between pure strategies and ESSs in the JMG. Since propositions and pure strategies are equivalent in the JMG, we also refer to the ESS as the evolutionary stable proposition (ESP). Therefore, assuming the set of ESPs in the JMG is indicated by ESP , we have ESP ⇔ ESS .
C. Replicator Dynamics on JMG
Once the interaction relationship between propositions has been determined, the next step is examining how the propositions evolve. In other words, what types of evolutionary dynamics is adopted by the population. To answer this problem, the RE is considered to mimick the evolutionary process of the population because of two reasons. First, it accurately simulates the evolution of the population in a well-mixed environment where individuals can randomly interact with other members of the population. Second, the RE is mathematically equivalent to the Lotka-Volterra equation of ecology [78] which describes the dynamics of species in an interactive biological system. The Lotka-Volterra equation closely models reality because it does not rely upon the rationality assumption which is fundamental but challenged in classical game theory. Therefore, the equivalent RE eliminates the controversy of the rationality assumption. The replicator dynamics on a JMG is defined as follows.
Definition 2: Given evidence m on an FOD , the belief or basic probability for proposition A, denoted as m(A), evolves in time according to the following equation:
where f A is the fitness of proposition A that
and φ is the average fitness of population 
For simplification, the differential dynamic system shown in (10)-(12) can be rewritten as follows:
where m i = m(i) and i ⊆ , i = ∅. In regard to the convergence and stability of the system (13), we have two corollaries as shown in the following. Corollary 3 (Convergence): Every solution trajectory of replicator dynamics system (13) converges to a fixed point.
Proof: We define a function V by the average payoff of population
and therefore, since i m i = 1
Equality holds if and only if all terms (J m) i for which m i > 0 take the same value, that is
Clearly, the above condition characterizes the fixed points of replicator dynamics system (13) where all pure strategies that are present in the population get precisely the same payoff. It shows that the average payoff of population V(m) increases over time first and then converges until the system reaches a fixed point, which implies that every solution trajectory converges to a fixed point.
Corollary 4 (Stability):
Let ASP be the set of asymptotically stable points (ASPs) of replicator dynamics system (13), and ESP be the set of ESPs of the corresponding JMG ( , J ), then m * ∈ ESP ⇔ m * ∈ ASP .
Proof: Let us first prove "⇒." Suppose m * ∈ ESP , m is a solution of (13) in a neighborhood U of m * , and 0 log 0 = 0 log ∞ = 0. We define a Lyapunov function by the relative entropy
Because logarithm is concave function and in terms of Jensen's inequality
Then, we calculate the derivative of H with respect to timė
According to [78, 
Based on Lyapunov's stability theory, m * is asymptotically stable, i.e., m * ∈ ASP . Second, let us prove "⇐." Assume m * ∈ ASP . According to Corollary 3, for the replicator dynamics system (13), the average payoff of population increases over time unless it reaches a fixed point. Because m * is a asymptotically stable fixed point, then
for all m = m * in some neighbourhood of m * . We replace m by 2m − m * (which is also near m * ), and can get
By expanding the right-hand side and transposing, it is found Corollary 3 ensures that a unique and convergent solution will be absolutely obtained by using the proposed ECR. Corollary 4 shows a one-to-one correspondence between ASPs of the replicator dynamics and ESPs of the JMG. According to Corollary 4, we can directly judge the stability of solution obtained by using the ECR, without extra calculating the eigenvalues of solution as shown in Theorem 1.
Example 2: Given an FOD = {a, b}, there is a JMG = ( , J ) where its payoff matrix J is shown in (9) . In this JMG, there are three propositions as pure strategies: a, b, and ab. Assume m(a) = x, m(b) = y, and m(ab) = z, where x + y + z = 1. According to the replicator dynamics, we can write (replacing, as usual, the time derivatives of x, y, z withẋ,ẏ,ż)
where
and
The fixed points of replicator dynamic system (14)-(16) can be obtained byẋ = 0,ẏ = 0, andż = 0. They are P * 1 = (1, 0, 0), P * 2 = (0, 1, 0), P * 3 = (0, 0, 1), P * 4 = (0, 0.5, 0.5), P * 5 = (0.5, 0.5, 0), and P * 6 = (0.5, 0, 0.5). According to Corollaries 2 and 4, fixed points P * 1 , P * 2 , and P * 3 are asymptotically stable, and P * 4 , P * 5 , and P * 6 are unstable. 
For example, for fixed point P *
Then, the stability of P * 1 is determined by the eigenvalues of the following characteristic equation:
where det is the determinant of a matrix, and I is the identity matrix. So, the eigenvalue λ can be calculated as λ 1 = −1, λ 2 = −1, and λ 3 = −0.5. According to Theorem 1, P * 1 is an asymptotically stable fixed point since all eigenvalues are negative numbers. Through this approach, the stability of other fixed points can be found, as shown in Table I . They are identical with that obtained by using Corollaries 2 and 4.
Graphically, a 2-D space known as simplex can clearly represent the evolutionary dynamics of propositions a, b, and ab in this example, as shown in Fig. 2 . In the simplex, every vertex of means that there only exists a sole proposition (i.e., strategy) in the population, edges represent that at least a proposition is missing in the population. The interior of the simplex corresponds to the condition of all propositions in coexistence. At each point of the simplex, the sum of the belief of all propositions is 1. In addition, the arrows in Fig. 2 represent the directions of evolution, where black circles indicate ASPs, and white circles are unstable fixed points. Fig. 2 clearly shows that there are three ASPs that are precisely ESPs of , and that there are three unstable fixed points located on the midpoints of each edge.
D. Evolution of Averaging Evidence
As previously stated, given an evidence, which is usually the average of multiple evidences in multisource information fusion, the replicator dynamics determines into which proposition this evidence will evolve. The following example shows the evolutionary process. 
In this paper, we simulate the evolutionary process of each proposition by using the fourth-order Runge-Kutta method, as shown in Fig. 3 , where the horizontal axis "Time" indicates time points in the Runge-Kutta method. According to Fig. 3 , given an initial configuration determined by evidence m, proposition ac survives and finally occupies the population at the end of evolution, while other propositions become extinct. For evidence m, the corresponding ESP is ac, denoted as ESP m = ac. Therefore, in m, the most supported object is either a or c. As shown in Fig. 3 , by using the Runge-Kutta method, the evolutionary curve of each proposition can be tracked, and the time required for reaching equilibrium can be obtained. In this paper, we assume the replicator dynamics equation reaches equilibrium when the maximum increment or decrement of propositions' mass values or beliefs between two adjacent time points is less than 10 −3 .
E. 2-D Measure
Within the ECR, Corollary 3 shows that an equilibrium state (ES), which is an either stable or unstable fixed point, will be obtained given any evidence. As proved in Corollary 4, the obtained ES is asymptotically stable if it is an ESP, otherwise it is an unstable ES. Yet, there is still another problem: if two different evidences evolve into the same ES, how can we distinguish them. By considering that the ECR contains a dynamic evolutionary process, we suggest to reflect such difference by using the time of evolution from initial state to the ES. Two examples are given as follows.
Example 4: Given two evidences, indicated by m 1 and m 2 , on FOD = {a, b} These results means that, if two evidences evolve to the same ES, say A, a higher m(A) leads to a lower t ES .
Therefore, we say that t ES measures the time cost of an evidence evolving to its associated ES. From a biology perspective, t ES reflects the evolutionary distance from the given evidence m to its associated ES ES M . Based on this consideration, we use t ES to further depict the relationship between m and ES M . Then, a 2-D measure is defined as the outcomes of the ECR.
Definition 3: Assume that there are n evidences indicated by m 1 , . . . , m n , where m is the average of these n evidences, the evolutionary output of the ECR is represented as follows:
where ES m is the ES associated with m based on replicator dynamics, and t ES is the time of m evolving to the ES. The time of evolving to an ES provides a reference for the evolutionary distance between the averaging evidence m and its associated ES ES m . It is worthy to notice that the final ES is asymptotically stable if ES m is an ESP, otherwise the ES is an unstable state where two or more propositions coexist and a slight disturbance will cause the output deviates from such unstable ES. In this sense, the stability of ES m implies the robustness of the outcomes of the ECR to some degrees. If ES m is stable, the multievidence system m 1 , . . . , m n has a good consistency. Conversely, if ES m is unstable, it means there may be highly discordant or conflicting information among evidences m 1 , . . . , m n . In addition, the proposed ECR is with two other properties.
1) The ECR is commutative, i.e., f
2) The ECR is idempotent, i.e., f ECR (m) = f ECR (m, . . . , m). Proof: Within the ECR, mainly, the first is to calculate the averaging evidence m by (7) 
IV. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES AND ANALYSIS
A. Combination of Highly Conflicting Evidences
Conflicting evidence combination [82] , [83] is a main concern to verify the effectiveness of combination rules in multisource information fusion.
Example 6: Zadeh's paradox [13] . Two doctors diagnose a patient, and they agree that the patient suffers from one of three diseases: 1) meningitis (M); 2) brain tumor (T); and 3) concussion (C). an FOD is determined as = {M, T, C}. Both of the doctors believe a tumor is unlikely, but they hold different opinions about the likely cause. Two diagnosis are given as follows:
It is found that these two evidences are highly conflicting. If using the classical Dempter's rule of combination to combine them, as shown in (2) and (3), the combination result is
and the conflict coefficient K = 0.99. This is an apparently counter-intuitive result. In each doctor's diagnosis, the patient most likely does not suffer from a tumor, but the synthesizing result shows that the patient 100% suffering from a tumor. This example was first given by Zadeh to show the doubts on the validity of Dempster's rule when information is highly conflicting [13] , [84] . Now, let's use the proposed ECR to integrate these two evidences. Assume each doctor is weighted the same, the averaging evidence is calculated as m(M) = 0.45, m(T) = 0.1, and m(C) = 0.45. Fig. 6 shows the evolutionary process of each proposition in m. In this figure, as evolutionary time increases, the belief of T goes to 0, and propositions M and C collectively average a total belief of 1. At the end of evolution, the ES is {(M, 0.5), (C, 0.5)} where M and C coexist. Moreover, we know that the ES is not stable resulting from highly conflicting information in m 1 and m 2 . Through the ECR, we obtain a reasonable result, and Zadeh's paradox is explained by the instability of an ES. 
B. More Illustrative Examples
In the following content, we will examine the proposed ECR through more classical paradoxes in DST.
Example 7: Dezert et al. [16] and Dezert and Tchamova [17] have presented the DP of Dempster's rule. A simple version [15] of that paradox is shown below.
Given an FOD = {θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 }, there are four evidences as follows:
When using Dempster's rule of combination, one gets the following:
It clearly shows that Dempster's rule does not respond to the combination of different evidences. It seems that evidence m 1 dominates other evidences since the combination result is always m 1 , which does not accord with people's expectation. Now, let us reconsider this example by using the proposed ECR. Moreover, several improved methods for evidence combination, including Murphy's simple average [22] , Deng's weighted average [23] , Han's sequential weighted combination [15] , proportional conflict redistribution (PCR6) rule [53] , have also been adopted to test the results. Because PCR6 is not associative, to get optimal results, the PCR6 rule is implemented by combining all evidences altogether at the same time. Here, assume a = 0.7 and b = 0.6. The results are listed in Table II . As illustrated in that table, apart from Dempster's rule, the counter-intuitive behaviors have been suppressed in all other methods. And in every case of combination, the most supported proposition obtained by the ECR totally accords with the results obtained by other improved methods. In addition, the decrease in t ES shows that the evolutionary distance to the ES m reduces with the accumulation of evidences, which further coincides with people's expectation.
Example 8: Han et al. [15] constructed a fictitious example to verify the rationality of new evidence combination rule. In a multisensor-based automatic target recognition system, assume the FOD is = {θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 }. In order to recognize an unknown target, the system has collected five evidences as shown in the following:
Based on different methods, the combination results are obtained in Table III. From Table III , in the results of Dempter's rule, m(θ 1 ) always equals 0 after combining m 3 , yet regardless of m 4 and m 5 . In contrast, if using other five methods, the counter-intuitive results are suppressed. In Deng's weighted average and Han's sequential weighted combination, the most supported target is always θ 1 for any cases, and m(θ 1 ) has an increasing trend when m 4 and m 5 arrive. For Murphy's simple average, PCR6 rule, and the proposed ECR, although m(θ 2 ) ever became the biggest one when combining m 1 , m 2 , and m 3 , the mistake is corrected as soon as m 4 arrives. Hence, the counter-intuitive behavior is also suppressed in the three methods. Our proposed ECR remains effective in this example.
Example 9: Evidence shifting paradox [14] , [15] describes another counter-intuitive behavior in DST. Consider a case in which a target is evaluated by l different experts, each with the TABLE III  RESULTS FOR EXAMPLE 8   TABLE IV  RESULTS FOR EXAMPLE 9 same importance. The FOD is = {θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 }. Each expert provides an identical assessment as given in the following:
where i = 1, . . . , l.
By using Dempster's rule, the combination result is m ⊕ (θ 1 ) = 1 − 0.94 l and m ⊕ ( ) = 0.94 l . If l is a big number, such as 100, we have m ⊕ (θ 1 ) = 1 − 0.94 100 = 0.9979, so the combination result strongly supports θ 1 . However, in each expert's assessment, m i (θ 1 ) = 0.06, which is very small. The example shows that the aggregation of a crowd's wisdom may generate counter-intuitive results when using Dempster's rule of combination. Now, let us study this paradox by using the proposed ECR and other improved methods. The results are shown in Table IV . Here, the PCR6 results in Table IV have been obtained by sequential (suboptimal) implementation of PCR6. As illustrated in Table IV , when the number of combined evidences increases, Dempster's rule, Murphy's simple average, Deng's weighted average, and PCR6 rule all generate counter-intuitive results. For Han's sequential weighted combination, although it generates reasonable results, yet m(θ 1 ) has a rising trend as l increases. Han's method will eventually produce a counter-intuitive result where m(θ 1 ) > 0.5 when l becomes large enough. Conversely, only the ECR always gets the reasonable result that ES m = , and the evolutionary time remains constant as the increase in l. The idempotent property of the ECR inhibits the evidence shifting paradox.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed an ECR for the evidence-based multisource information fusion from an EGT perspective. Within the framework of ECR, original evidences are averaged by their weights, and a game model, called JMG, is proposed to formalize the interaction relationship between propositions. Then, we utilize the replicator dynamics equation to mimick the evolution of a population. And finally, an ES is obtained to express the combination results. According to the obtained ES, we can find the most biologically supported proposition for the decision-making and other purposes. Experimental results show that the proposed ECR has suppressed the counter-intuitive results in many paradoxes of DST, thereby demonstrating the rationality and effectiveness of the proposed method. Some mathematical properties of the ECR, such as solution's stability and convergence, have also been analyzed and proved. Of course, there still remains some problems to be solved in future research. Below are summaries of several noticeable issues.
First, the ECR is not associative, all evidences must be combined together at the same time. Two main reasons lead to the nonassociativity of the ECR: 1) average mechanism and 2) the replicator dynamics equation. Arguments about the necessity of associativity were presented in [24] , [85] , and [86] . For the case of requiring the associativity, as an alternative, we are trying to build a modified ECR which meets the quasi-associativity [86] . Second, the ECR does not preserve the neutrality for a vacuous evidence m v (FOD) = 1, i.e., m ⊕ ECR m v = m. Third, in some cases the ECR is sensitive to the discord of evidences but fails to produce a reasonable result. For example, Voorbraak [28] As reported by Voorbraak [28] , this result is counter-intuitive because B intuitively seems to share a probability mass of 0.5 twice, whereas both A and C share a probability mass of 0.5 with B only once and are once assigned 0.5 individually. Intuitively, B is less confirmed than A and C, but they are equally confirmed by Dempster's rule. By using the proposed ECR, we obtain an unstable ES {(AB, 0.5), (BC, 0.5)}. The ECR has detected the discord of evidences which results in an unstable solution, but does not give a reasonable combination result.
In summary, although there are some drawbacks at present, the proposed ECR is still a useful method for evidence combination. First, it imports the idea of population evolution into evidence combination, which is not presented in previous studies. Second, the ECR has a mathematical basis to ensure that the solution is with some desirable properties, such as convergence, stability, and idempotence. Third, compared with other methods, the ECR can effectively restrain the counter-intuitive behaviors appeared in many typical paradoxes of DST. In future research, we will continue to improve and perfect the framework of ECR.
